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I address the causes of the gender wage gap with a new dynamic model of wage,
hours, and job changes that permits me to decompose the gap into a portion due
to gender differences in preferences for hours of work and in constraints. The dy-
namic model allows the differences in constraints to reflect possible gender dif-
ferences in job arrival rates, job destruction rates, the mean and variance of the
wage offer distribution, and the wage cost of part-time work. The model is esti-
mated using the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
I find that the preference for part-time work increases with marriage and num-
ber of children among women but not among men. These demographic factors
explain a sizable fraction of the gender gap in employment, but they explain no
more than 6 percent of the gender wage gap. Differences in constraints, mainly in
the form of the mean offered wages and rates of job arrival and destruction, ex-
plain most of the gender wage gap. Policy simulation results suggest that, relative
to reducing the wage cost of part-time work, providing additional employment
protection to part-time jobs is more effective in reducing the gender wage gap.
Keywords. Gender wage gap, part-time work, job mobility, women.
JEL classification. D91, J16, J31, J63.
1. Introduction
There is a widely documented gender gap in wages between employed men and
women.1 Isolating how much of this gap is a result of true differences in offered wages
faces several challenges. One is that wages differ between full-time and part-time work,
and men and women differ in their hours of work patterns (Blank (1990)). Another is that
a different fraction of men and women are employed, which leads to a well known pos-
sible selection bias that could differ between men and women. Both of these differences
can, however, be a result of offered wage distributions and not just a result of differences
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in preferences. The goal facing most researchers is how to decompose the observed
gender wage gap of employed men and women into differences in preferences and con-
straints. This decomposition is important for policy. If women would have received a
higher wage by working full-time but did not choose to do so due to strong preferences
for part-time work, their lower wages reflect outcomes from voluntary choices rather
than any malfunctioning of the labor market.
This paper conducts a new decomposition of the gap. The standard static selection
model of Heckman (1974) can be used to address the selection-into-employment issue,
and a slight modification of that model can be used to allow selection into part-time
and full-time work (a three-choice model, along with no work) can be used to address
the selection into part-time and full-time work. However, such a static model does not
capture the dynamics of job mobility and movements between part-time and full-time
work. Men and women differ not only in cross-sectional fractions in full-time work, part-
time work, and nonemployment, but also in their job turnover dynamics: women are
more likely to quit jobs for nonemployment and job changes for women are more often
involved with changes in hours of work at the same time.2 Differences in job turnover
behavior can result from differences in preferences, constraints, or both. In a dynamic
model with labor market frictions, the conditional wage differential between full-time
and part-time work is no longer a result of preferences differences (Hwang, Mortensen,
and Reed (1998)).
This paper sets up and estimates a dynamic model of wage, hours, and job changes.
The estimated model is used to quantify the relative importance of the preferences for
part-time work and various sources of labor market constraints in explaining the gen-
der gap in wages, employment, hours of work, and job turnover. The dynamic model
allows the differences in constraints to reflect possible gender differences in job arrival
rates, job destruction rates, the mean and variance of the wage offer distribution, and
the full-time/part-time wage premium. Workers are heterogeneous in their work pref-
erences and are subject to preference shocks due to fertility. Firms are heterogeneous in
the costs of offering part-time work, reflected as differences in the offered wages for full-
time and part-time work (Oi (1962)). In addition, the baseline wage (full-time wage) de-
pends on individual characteristics and worker–firm match quality. In a frictional labor
market, there is a distribution of firms offering the same worker different match values.
The worker’s labor supply decision is similar to the problem studied in the labor supply
literature, where the wage itself depends on the labor supply decision.3 An additional
feature of the model is that job offer arrival rates and destruction rates differ between
full-time work and part-time work. Therefore, besides any direct utility-augmenting ef-
fects, hours of work at the intensive margin may also be a productive factor in sustaining
a worker–firm match.
The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using the 1996 panel of
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). I use the estimated model to
2See Becker and Lindsay (1994), Altonji and Paxson (1992), Loprest (1992), Sicherman (1996), Keith and
McWilliams (1999), Royalty (1998), and Holzer and Lalonde (2000). I provide further evidence in the next
section.
3See Moffitt (1984), Lundberg (1985), Altonji and Paxson (1988), and Averett and Hotchkiss (1997).
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evaluate the relative importance of various factors in explaining the gender gap in hourly
wages. In order of importance, the key factors explaining the gender wage gap are the
mean offered wage (conditional on individuals’ characteristics), job search parameters,
wage cost of part-time work provision, and demographic factors affecting the part-time
work preferences. For instance, among high-education (some college attended) individ-
uals, these factors explain 658, 339, 98, and 55 percent of the gender wage gap, re-
spectively. I find that marriage and children strongly increase the preference for part-
time work among women relative to men. Although these demographic factors explain
a sizable share of the gender gap in employment, the impacts on the gender wage gap
are rather limited. In fact, reducing the impacts of demographics on women’s part-time
work preference tends to reduce both full-time wage and (especially) part-time wage, be-
cause of the changes in the reservation wages, which decrease the average match quality
in steady state. Driven by the increase of women working full time, the overall wage (un-
conditional on hours) increases slightly. Overall, the evidence points to the importance
of labor market constraints in generating the gender wage gap. Difference in the job
search parameters is also important, particularly when it comes to explaining the gen-
der difference in the present value of a full-time job (taking into account differences in
job durations).
I use the model to conduct two counterfactual experiments. In an equal pay pol-
icy, where the offered hourly wage is invariant to hours of work, the gender gap in em-
ployment is reduced by 113 percent among the high educated and 236 percent among
the low educated. Its impact on the preexisting gender wage gap is rather limited. It re-
duces the overall gender wage gap by 13 percent among high-education individuals and
48 percent among low-education individuals. Because the policy provides incentive for
part-time work, overall wage decreases. An alternative equal protection policy is more
effective in reducing the gender wage gap. The model estimates suggest that the rate
of job destruction from part-time jobs is a few times greater than from full-time jobs.
When the job destruction probability is equalized between full-time and part-time work
(to the lower level of full-time jobs), the overall gender wage gap can be reduced by 61
percent and 10 percent among high- and low-education individuals, respectively.
There have been a few papers specifying a behavioral model to explain the gender
wage gap. Bowlus (1997) is the first paper that builds a job search model to explain the
gender wage gap. She finds that differences in search behavior can explain 20–30 per-
cent of weekly wage differentials in the United States. Recognizing the importance of
part-time work among female workers, Bowlus and Grogan (2009) estimated a similar
model for each gender and for part-time and full-time workers separately. Their results
indicate that the role of search behavior in explaining the gender wage differential varies
by hours of work. However, the choice of part-time or full-time work is an endogenous
decision that is determined by preference and constraints. Hence, it is important to
model workers’ selection over jobs and over hours jointly, which is the approach taken
in this paper. More recently, Flabbi (2010) estimated the role of taste-based discrimi-
nation and Gayle and Golan (2012) considered a model of labor supply, occupational
sorting, and human capital accumulation with statistical discrimination to explain the
declining gender wage gap over time. These papers do not focus on the dynamics of job
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changes and the effect of preferences for part-time work on the gender gap. Because of
the partial-equilibrium framework, one limitation of this paper is that I do not further
decompose the differentials in the wage offer distribution into discrimination and pro-
ductivity differences.
In terms of modeling framework, this paper is close to Dey and Flinn (2005),
Bloemen (2008), and Flabbi and Moro (2012). Their papers identify workers’ preferences
for job amenities by estimating models with search frictions. Dey and Flinn (2005) es-
timates a search model where job offers are characterized by wages and health insur-
ance provision. Bloemen (2008) focuses on the difference between desired hours and
offered hours resulting from hours restrictions within jobs. Flabbi and Moro (2012) find
that women place a small yet positive value on hours flexibility and the impact of flex-
ibility is substantial on certain labor market outcomes.4 With the exception of Dey and
Flinn (2005), these papers do not study the dynamics of job–job transitions and hours
changes. By using a panel data set containing detailed information on jobs, wages, and
hours changes, this paper identifies the preference for part-time work for both men
and women, and derives its implications with respect to the gender wage gap. The es-
timated model also allows for a richer set of observed and unobserved heterogeneity of
the worker and the offered wage.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data and descriptive
statistics highlighting the gender differential in job turnover. Section 3 builds a dynamic
model of job mobility and labor supply, followed by estimation and identification strat-
egy discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 conducts
counterfactual analysis to decompose the gender gap and counterfactual policy evalua-
tions. Section 7 concludes.
2. Data and descriptive statistics
2.1 The data
The data set I use is the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP). The 1996 SIPP is a 4-year panel comprising 12 interviews (waves). Each wave col-
lects comprehensive information on demographics, labor market activities, and income
for each member of the household over the 4-month reference period. For every primary
and secondary job that a respondent holds, the SIPP assigns a unique job identification
and records job-specific monthly earnings.
There are two main advantages of using the SIPP compared to other U.S. panel
data sets (such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth or the Panel Study of In-
come Dynamics). First, it has a short recall period, making it an ideal data set to study
short-term employment dynamics. For instance, job mobility is very common especially
among young workers. If a young worker changed jobs in a given calendar year, about
one-fifth of them had multiple job changes within the same calendar year (Liu (2015)).
This means that job mobility documented at annual frequency understates the extent
4In Flabbi and Moro (2012), due to data limitations, the hours flexibility is equivalent to part-time work
in estimation.
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of job–job transitions by about one-fifth.5 The other advantage is that the SIPP con-
tains a unique job identification (ID) for every job an employed worker had through
the sample period. It records job-specific wages and hours at each interview date (ev-
ery 4 months), which makes it possible to obtain more precisely measured changes in
job-specific wages and hours when job transitions take place.
Details of sample selection are given in Appendix A. For each gender group, I con-
struct two separate panels: one consisting of low-education individuals (those with
high school education) and the other including high-education individuals (those with
college education). Each panel contains individuals aged between 23 and 35.6 The fi-
nal samples consists of 1032 women and 782 men in the high-education sample and
613 women and 564 men in the low-education sample. The unit period of analysis is
4 months (one wave in the survey).
Table 1 presents summary statistics. Eighty-five percent of college-educated women
and 74 percent of high school educated women are employed. Among those employed
women, around 85 percent work full time. In contrast, nearly all men are employed and
98 percent of them are employed by full-time jobs. Among high-education individuals,
the mean hourly wage of men working full time is 1371 dollars, whereas the mean hourly
Table 1. Summary statistics.
College High School
Female Male Female Male
Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
Age 2975 324 2989 309 2974 327 2962 327
Has children 059 049 046 050 075 043 053 050
Married 070 046 063 048 066 047 061 049
White 077 042 080 040 071 045 073 045
Metropolitan residence 084 037 083 037 075 043 075 043
Hours of work per week 3299 1613 4466 971 2788 1792 4200 1008
Employed 085 036 099 009 074 044 098 015
FT work among employed 087 033 098 013 084 037 098 014
Hourly wage: full time 1225 489 1371 523 927 340 1124 388
Hourly wage: part time 1160 574 1023 448 804 325 904 380
Number of individuals 1032 782 613 564
Number of observations 8828 6719 5154 4827
Note: Wages are deflated using the monthly urban consumer price index (CPI = 1 in 1996:1) and then averaged over a
4-month period (per wave). Standard deviation is abbreviated s.d.
5Almost all existing studies on female job mobility use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth, which surveys at an annual frequency. The evidence presented in this paper is generally in line with
these existing studies. The differences will be highlighted below.
6Job mobility is most frequent and is the most important way for wage growth in early careers (Topel
and Ward (1992)). Fertility shocks are also common during these ages. Both events provide important iden-
tifications to the decomposition of the gender gap (discussed later). Focusing on the mobility and fertility
decisions in this period creates the foundation for the persistent gender differentials to observe over the
whole labor market career.
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wage of full-time working women is 10 percent lower at 1225 dollars. Gender wage gap
is more pronounced among low-education individuals. The mean hourly full-time wage
of men is 1124 dollars, which is almost 2 dollars more than the full-time wage earned by
women.
2.2 Descriptive statistics: Gender differences in job turnover
Table 2 presents descriptive evidence on gender differences in job turnover. Among
high-education individuals, the rate of transition from employment to nonemployment
(every 4 months) is 21 percent for women, which is over five times than the rate of men
(04 percent). Interestingly, for both men and women, part-time (PT) jobs are more likely
to end in nonemployment than full-time (FT) jobs. For instance, among high-education
women, the transition probability from a part-time job to unemployment is 64 percent,
whereas the probability of moving from full-time job to unemployment is only 14 per-
cent. The rate of direct job to job transitions is quite similar between men and women
Table 2. Rate of labor market transitions between waves, by gender.
College High School
Female Male Female Male
From employment to unemployment
Mean 0021 0004 0032 0007
From PT jobs 0064 0030 0068 0014
From FT jobs 0014 0003 0025 0007
Rate of job–job transition
Mean 0054 0058 0060 0058
From PT jobs 0071 0177 0086 0275
From FT jobs 0052 0056 0055 0054
Among which:
From FT to PT (%) 941 333 1478 305
From PT to FT (%) 941 444 985 687
From FT to FT (%) 7446 9167 6404 8817
From PT to PT (%) 672 056 1133 191
Job duration
Mean 1083 1224 1026 1245
(037) (047) (056) (064)
Part-time job 910 687 605 768
(091) (158) (084) (175)
Full-time job 1127 1249 1167 1281
(041) (049) (068) (063)
Between-job wage growth 0029 0064 −0010 0062
(0020) (0021) (0021) (0023)
Within-job wage growth 0016 0012 0014 0011
(0003) (0003) (0003) (0003)
Within-job wage growth: FT job 0015 0012 0012 0011
(0003) (0003) (0003) (0003)
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(54 and 58 percent, respectively). However, composition of the job–job transitions is
very different across genders. For women, about 20 percent of the transitions involve
changes in the hours of work (either from part time and full time or vice versa). Among
men, close to 90 percent of job–job transitions are between full-time jobs. Fewer men
work part time and among those who do, part-time work appeared transitory: the tran-
sition probability from part-time to full-time jobs is a few times higher than the rate of
transition between part-time jobs. For women, transitions between part-time jobs are
common and account for 67 percent of total job–job transitions among the high edu-
cated and 113 percent among the low educated.7
The differences in job turnover lead to differences in the mean duration of jobs. The
average job duration among high-education women is 43 months (108 × 4), which is
about 5 months shorter than the average job duration held by men.8 Part of this is be-
cause more women work part time and the mean duration of part-time jobs is shorter
than the mean duration of full-time jobs. Among full-time workers, the job duration of
women remains about 5 months (12 × 4) shorter relative to men. Given that the rates
of job mobility from full-time jobs are similar between genders, the main reason for job
duration differences appears to be that female workers are more likely to quit to unem-
ployment than male workers.
The last three rows of Table 2 show wage growth between jobs and within jobs. There
is no significant evidence that men and women experience differential wage growth
within jobs. Among high-education men and high-education women, within-job wage
growth (every 4 months) is 12 percent and 16 percent, respectively. When within-job
wage growth is calculated for full-time jobs, again I do not find any significant evidence
of gender difference. Turning to wage growth between job–job transitions, I find some
notable gender differences. The between-job wage growth is 64 percent for men and 29
percent for women.9 The standard errors of between-job wage changes are large, pos-
sibly reflecting measurement errors. The evidence is in line with Loprest (1992), who
provides strong evidence that young women on average have smaller between-job wage
growth than men.10 This empirical observation underlies the importance of modeling
job–job transitions in explaining the gender wage gap.
7Hour changes are much more common between jobs than within jobs. For instance, among high-
education women, the fraction of hour changes within job spell per period is 36 percent (18 percent from
full time to part time and 17 percent from part time to full time). Among low-education women, the frac-
tion of hour changes within job spell is 39 percent (19 percent from full time to part time and 20 percent
from part time to full time). These findings are also consistent with a small literature suggesting that there
seem to be frictions in hour adjustment within jobs (Altonji and Paxson (1992), Euwals (2001), Blundell,
Brewer, and Francesconi (2008)).
8The job durations here are calculated for completed job spells only (in addition to the sample selection
criteria outlined in Appendix A).
9Between-job wage growth is defined as changes in log wages between periods t and t − 1, conditional
on job change taking place in period t. One may question the reliability of the reported hourly wage in the
immediate period prior to job change. This result is robust if one defines wage growth as log wage changes
between t and t − 2.
10Her definition of wage growth is based on annual wage growth between years with recorded job
changes. Annual wage could be a mixture of wages from the new job and wages from the old job. Annual
wage can also be contaminated by the total periods of nonemployment within the year.
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The empirical facts documented above are qualitatively similar among low-
education individuals. However, there are also some notable differences. Transition rates
from employment to unemployment are higher for the low educated, and job mobility
involving part-time work is more common. Among low-education women, 113 percent
of job–job transitions are between part-time jobs, which is larger than the share of part-
time to full-time transitions (at 985 percent). This stands in contrast to part-time jobs
held by high-education women, where transition to a full-time job is more likely than
transition to another part-time job. The overall rate of transition from full-time jobs to
part-time jobs is also higher among low-education women than high-education women.
3. The model
I build a dynamic model of job search in which a worker makes labor supply, job mo-
bility, and employment decisions jointly. The assumptions of the model are as follows.
An individual i maximizes the expected present value of utility over an infinite horizon.
In each decision period (t), both unemployed and employed workers search for job op-
portunities at no cost. For any given worker, a job offer j differs in two dimensions: the
value of match and the wage cost of part-time work. As a result, the labor supply deci-
sion is worker–firm-specific and will be determined endogenously by the preference of
the worker and the technology of the firm. Upon receiving an offer, unemployed workers
face three choices: full-time work (hpijt = 0, hfijt = 1), part-time work (hpijt = 1, hfijt = 0), or
continue in the unemployment state (hpijt = hfijt = 0). The employment indicator is de-
noted by hit ≡ hpijt + hfijt . For an employed worker receiving a job offer, she can either
remain in the current job or switch to the new employer and choose the optimal hours
of work. Employed workers can exit to nonemployment in two ways, either through ex-
ogenous layoffs or through voluntary quits following a fertility shock.
Utility function. The baseline utility function is specified as
uijt = yijt +φ0y2ijt + αph
(
1− hfijt
)+ αh(1− hijt)
+ αhnnit
(
1− hfijt
)+ xhiβh(1− hfijt) (1)
+
K∑
k=2
1{type = k}(μhk(1− hfijt))
The individual’s utility depends on her income (yit ), which is determined by a budget
constraint that is discussed in detail below. There is an income effect that is generated
by the parameter φ0.11 She faces direct utilities of part-time work (α
p
h ) and unemploy-
ment (αh + αph ).12 These parameters should in general be positive, reflecting the value
11The quadratic parameter φ0 also has a qualitative effect similar to the interaction between income and
leisure. For instance, suppose φ0 is negative. Then, relative to part-time work, the additional utility gain at
full-time employment from a given increase in total income is lower. This effect is qualitatively the same as
having a positive interaction between income and leisure.
12These preference parameters are normalized with respect to full-time work.
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of additional leisure relative to full-time work. The model allows the utilities to differ
by certain state variables. In particular, parameter αhn captures differential utilities of
unemployment and part-time work when there is an additional child. The vector of co-
variates xhi is assumed to affect the utility of unemployment and part-time work via
parameter vector βh. The model can allow for K unobserved “types” of individuals, and
the type-specific utilities of unemployment and part-time work (type 1 being normal-
ized to zero) are denoted by μhk. Therefore, individual unobserved heterogeneity enters
into the model via these permanent components in preference, which take a discrete
factor representation (e.g., Heckman and Singer (1984)).
The work preference may change over time due to the arrival of children. An addi-
tional child arrives exogenously because of fertility shocks. I model births as a stochastic
process that follows
nit+1 =
{
nit + 1 with probability ρi,
nit with probability 1− ρi.
The probability of a fertility shock, ρi, follows a logistic function
ρi =
exp(xniβf )
1+ exp(xniβf )
 (2)
where xni is a vector of predetermined observed characteristics of the individual (in-
cluding a constant). To reduce computational burden, the individual can have up to two
children.
Budget constraint and wage function. The individual consumes all her income each
period. When the worker meets employer j in period t, the potential disposable income
in each alternative is given by
yijt =wijt ×Hijt  (3)
Gross earnings is the product of the wage rate (wijt ) and work hours (Hijt ). Hours Hijt
may take three weekly work hours: 0, 30, and 40 corresponding to hijt = 0, hpijt = 1, and
h
f
ijt = 1, respectively.
The log offered wage rate by employer j to worker i in period t is given by
ln(wijt)= xwiβw − ξijthpijt + aijt (4)
where xwi is a vector of observed individual characteristics (including a constant), aijt is
a match-specific wage component, and ξijt is a match-specific cost of part-time work,
representing the “price” of part-time job facing the worker; aijt and ξijt are constant
within a job spell and are independently distributed. Thus, both are fixed effects spe-
cific to a worker–firm match.13 The mean of ξijt is expected to be positive, reflecting the
13In the absence of firm data one cannot distinguish between a pure firm effect and a pure match effect.
Component aijt can be thought of as capturing the part of the matching rent that accrues to the worker.
I take the bargaining process that produces this sharing outcome as given. Note that individual heterogene-
ity in the form of “ability” types in the offered wage equation may be attempted (which may be correlated
with unobserved preference types) when more than one job spell is observed for the individual.
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empirical fact that part-time work typically carries a lower accepted wage rate than full-
time work. Fixed costs of hiring and training is one potential explanation for the wage
differential (Oi (1962)). The novelty here is that the ξijt is heterogeneous across firms,
which could arise from quasi-fixed labor costs that are different across firms. It is an
important parameter of interest, given that it is one measure of the constraint facing
workers when they choose between part-time and full-time work in the labor market.
In this framework, each job offer consists of two independent match-specific elements:
the wage cost of part-time work (ξijt ) and the match value (aijt ). Following the empirical
job search literature (since Flinn and Heckman (1982)), the distribution of offered match
values follows a normal distribution G with zero mean and variance σ2a0. The wage cost
of part-time work follows a distribution F , which is assumed independent of G.14
Intertemporal optimization problem. All individuals begin their lives in the unem-
ployment state. Let αit denote the set of state variables summarizing the individual’s
characteristics, where αit ≡ {nit xhixwi type}. The set of state variables summarizing
the firm’s characteristics and match quality is denoted by Sijt ≡ {aijt ξijt}. Let V (αit) de-
note the value of nonemployment. The value of nonemployment for the worker is de-
fined as
V (αit) = uit
(
hp = 0hf = 0)+ (1− λn)βE(V (αit+1))
(5)
+ λnβEmax[V (αit+1)W (Sijt+1αit+1)]
where λn is the probability that an offer arrives in each period and β is the dis-
count factor and W (Sijt+1αit+1) is the value of employment if the worker is offered
a job with characteristics Sijt+1. The job offer is acceptable to a worker provided that
W (Sijt+1αit+1) is larger than V (αit+1). The value function of employment with firm j
is given by15
W (Sijt αit)= max
k∈Hijt
Jk(Sijt αit) (6)
where
Jk(Sijt αit)
= uijkt + λek(1− δk)βEmax
[
W (Sijt+1αit+1)W (Sij′t+1αit+1)V (αit+1)
]
(7)+ (1− λek)(1− δk)βEmax[W (Sijt+1αit+1)V (αit+1)]
+ δkβE
(
V (αit+1)
)

14The distribution of wage offers conditional on worker and firm type is determined by the distribution
of match-specific productivity, which is exogenously given. This setup can be interpreted as workers hav-
ing no bargaining power and receiving a take-it-or-leave-it offer from firms. Although it is potentially very
interesting to provide foundations to the offered wage equation in a general equilibrium framework, for
computational reasons and given the nature of the data available, the estimation of a general equilibrium
model is beyond the scope of this paper.
15Because the decision period is discrete, additional restrictions are placed on the timing of the events.
In particular, it is assumed that the individual is only able to receive a job offer conditional on the current
job not being displaced. When the individual is displaced, she has to remain unemployed for at least one
period.
Quantitative Economics 7 (2016) Explaining the gender wage gap 421
where Hijt denotes the index representation of the choice set, including (i) part-time
work (hp = 1, hf = 0) and (ii) full-time work (hp = 0, hf = 1) and uijkt denotes the util-
ity of alternative k, where k is an index representation of the choices. Given the hours
choice k, λek is the job offer arrival rate when the worker is employed and δk is the ex-
ogenous layoff probability in each period. Therefore, besides the direct impact on the
offered wage (through parameter ξijt ) and utility, the part-time/full-time work decision
also influences the on-the-job offer arrival probability and job destruction rate. This
captures essential patterns of job turnovers in the data.16 Additionally, it allows current
labor supply decisions to have dynamic effects on future wages, because wage growth
in this type of models is driven by job turnovers determined by these parameters. For
instance, if full-time work has a low layoff probability, full-time work would become a
productive factor in sustaining the worker–firm match. This would imply higher future
wages on average. Also, when the job offer arrival probability is higher if the individual
works part time (relative to full-time work) as the estimated parameters later suggest,
the model allows for part-time work to be a stepping stone to full-time work. Part-time
work may be attractive even when the offered wage is low, because the individual takes
into account that, by working part time, she can sample new offers and climb up the job
ladder at a faster rate in the future.
3.1 Analysis of the model
Labor supply decisions. Given the worker and firm types, there exists a set of critical val-
ues {a∗(ξ) a¯(ξ)} that spreads out workers into different work hour arrangements,17
hp = 0 hf = 0 if a < a¯(ξ) (8)
hp = 1 hf = 0 if a¯(ξ) < a < a∗(ξ) (9)
hp = 0 hf = 1 if a >max{a∗(ξ) a¯(ξ)} (10)
where a¯(ξ) is the reservation match for an unemployed individual to work for a job
type ξ. It is defined as the solution that equalizes the value of unemployment and em-
ployment (V =W (aξ)). The individual accepts a job offer from type ξ firm if the match
value is above a¯(ξ). The term a∗(ξ) is the cutoff value for choosing full-time work, which
solves the equation J1(aξ)= J2(aξ). The individual works full time if the job is accept-
able and the match value is greater than a∗(ξ).18
16For instance, Table 2 shows that the probability of exiting from employment to unemployment is unan-
imously higher for part-time jobs than full-time jobs.
17In the remainder of this section, I drop the worker, firm, and time subscripts given that they do not add
much to the discussion. Although the individual’s type is not made explicit, the analysis in this section is
conditional on the type of the worker (αit ).
18If the probabilities of offer arrival and layoff do not vary by the hours of work, the choice of match-
specific hours is made simply by comparing the contemporaneous utility between part-time and full-time
work. In the current model, given that the choice of hours on the current job also affects the continuation
value in the future, the reservation wage for part-time/full-time work is also different from the implications
of a static model.
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Figure 1. Critical match quality of hours of work.
The labor supply function for a worker–firm match depends on the values of un-
employment, part-time work, and full-time work. Figure 1 draws the cutoff values under
two values of unemployment, holding everything fixed except for the value of the match.
For a type α worker matched to a type ξ firm, if the value of nonemployment is low, then
the worker would not work if the offered match is less than aB, would choose part-time
work if the match value is between aB and aA, and would choose full-time work if the
match value is higher than aA. However, if the value of nonemployment is sufficiently
high, part-time work may never be optimal. In this case, she works full time as long as
the match is above aC and works at zero hours as long as the match is below aC . Given
that the utility function is monotonically increasing in the value of match, the decision
to work can be characterized by a critical match a¯(ξ) that is dependent on the type of
firm the individual meets out of nonemployment.
Employment dynamics. Conditional on α, part-time work is in the worker’s choice set
as long as a¯(ξ) < a∗(ξ). This implies that the cost of providing part-time work is less than
some cutoff value k0. Whenever a firm’s cost of providing part-time work exceeds k0, a
utility maximizing worker of type α would never choose to work part time, regardless
of the match value offered by the firm. The larger the worker’s preference for hour is,
the higher k0 is and there would be a larger range of firms at which she would accept
part-time work.
For a type α worker, the transition probability from nonemployment to part-time
work is
λn
∫
ξ<k0
[
G
(
a∗(ξ)
)−G(a¯(ξ))]dF(ξ) (11)
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The probability of moving from nonemployment to full-time work is
λn
(∫
ξ<k0
G˜
(
a∗(ξ)
)
dF(ξ)+
∫
ξ>k0
G˜
(
a¯(ξ)
)
dF(ξ)
)
 (12)
where G˜(x)= 1−G(x).
Job mobility dynamics. When an employed worker receives an outside job offer (de-
noted by (a′ ξ′)), she compares the value of continuing employment with the current
firm with the optimal value of working for the alternative employer:
M = 1 if M∗ > 0 M = 0 elsewhere,
(13)
M∗ =W (a′ ξ′)−W (aξ)
Compared with a standard on-the-job search model (Burdett (1978)), the difference here
is that the decision rule for job mobility is generally not just a function of the match
values. In addition to the match values, it depends on the type of firm the worker meets,
and observed and unobserved characteristics of the worker. Formally, the reservation
match for job mobility is defined as ar(ξ′ aξ), where W (ar(ξ′ aξ)ξ′) = W (aξ). Job
mobility takes place provided that there is an offer whose offered match value satisfies
a′ > ar(ξ′ aξ).19
Job mobility dynamics is richer in the current model because the worker can com-
bine changes in hours of work with job mobility. Conditional on the type of the worker
and the current job, the probability that the worker chooses to exit the current job to
work full time on the new job is
λek
∫
G˜
(
max
{
ar
(
ξ′ aξ
)
 a∗
(
ξ′
)})
dF
(
ξ′
)
 (14)
The probability of leaving the current job to work part time on the new job is
λek
∫
ξ′<k1
[
G
(
a∗
(
ξ′
))−G(ar(ξ′ aξ))]dF(ξ′) (15)
where k1 is the cutoff value for the type of the outside firm ξ′ such that a∗(k1) =
ar(k1 aξ) and λek is the probability of offer arrival conditional on the current choice
of work hours k. When a worker meets a firm that makes part-time work very costly rel-
ative to her current employer (ξ′ > k1), she would never choose to quit the current job
and work part time on the new job.
4. Identification and estimation
The decision period in the model is 4 months, corresponding to the interview frequency
in the SIPP. The data are divided into four groups by gender and education of the in-
19Note that if a new job is acceptable, it follows that the value of the new job must be larger than that of
her current job. Because the worker is employed on the current job, this implies that the new job must be
above the reservation utility for employment (i.e., h > 0).
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dividual: male-high school, male-college, female-high school, and female-college. The
empirical model is estimated separately on each subsample. Therefore, all parameters
in the model are assumed to be gender- and education-specific. The assumption fol-
lows under the notion that jobs are segregated by gender and education groups (Bowlus
(1997)).
For each subgroup, the parameter set consists of utility function parameters
(βhα
p
hαhαhnφ0), wage equation parameters (βwσ
2
a0), labor market friction param-
eters (λnλekδk) (k = {12}), fertility shock parameters βf , and type-specific parame-
ters (μh2πh2 ξ1 ξ2πξ2), where both worker and firm types are discretized into two
points of support. The discount factor is not estimated and is fixed at 09.20 The offered
wage equation is estimated jointly with choice probabilities predicted by the structural
model.
4.1 Identification
The key empirical challenge is to separately identify the distribution of preferences for
hours of work, the skill distribution (which takes the form of match-specific produc-
tivity), and the distribution of the cost of providing part-time work. Given the implied
selection rule spreading workers into different hours of work, these parameters can be
identified even with cross-sectional data on hours of work and earnings. For instance,
by changing labor supply preferences, the reservation wages change, which leads to
a different proportion of the population working part time, full time, or at all (as im-
plied by equations (8)–(10)). At the same time, the average match quality conditional on
hours of work shifts due to individuals (responding to changes in the reservation match
quality) sorting into different hours of work. Combined with the observed conditional
wage distribution and the distributional assumption (log normal) on the unobserved
match quality, preferences for hours of work and the skill distribution are separately
identified. By similar arguments, the wage cost of part-time work affects the wage equa-
tion directly through the part-time/full-time wage differential and indirectly through
changes in the composition of match qualities (conditional on hours of work) resulting
from self-selection on wage gains.21 The indirect effects are predicted by the structure of
the model and the distributional assumptions on the match quality, as in a similar class
of models. The dispersion of wage residuals conditional on full-time and part-time work
(heteroskedasticity) identifies the heterogeneity of the wage cost of part-time work, as
in the class of random coefficients models.
20The annualized discount factor is 073 (= 093). Rust (1994) shows that the discount factor is nonpara-
metrically unidentified in infinite-horizon discrete choice models such as the one considered in this paper.
In Keane and Wolpin (1997), the estimated discount factor (from a finite-horizon dynamic discrete choice
model of career choice among young men) is 078. I find that the slope of the estimated likelihood function
is small around changes to the discount factor, so the estimation results are similar if the discount factor is
set at a higher rate.
21As first discussed in the heterogeneous treatment effects literature (Bjorklund and Moffitt (1987) and
Heckman and Robb (1985)), heterogeneity in the offered part-time and full-time wage differential ξ gener-
ates additional selection bias because ξ directly enters both the labor supply equation and the wage equa-
tion.
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Apart from nonlinearities and distributional assumptions, exclusion restrictions are
included as additional sources of identification. We need at least one variable that shifts
the worker’s preference xhi but is not included in xwi in the wage equation. This is
the usual exclusion restriction in any selection model where wage is unobserved for
nonworkers. The excluded variables include number of children and marital status,
which are assumed exogenous and uncorrelated to the error term in the wage equa-
tion. Note that the number of children evolves over time subject to unexpected fer-
tility shocks, which provide an additional restriction to identify the work preferences.
Because the wage itself is in the equations of employment and hour choices, we also
need one additional variable in xwi that is not included in xhi. I use regional unem-
ployment rate and metropolitan residence as wage instruments (e.g., Keane and Moffitt
(1998)).22
The panel data set contains a unique job ID that is used to trace job mobility, em-
ployment, and associated wage dynamics in the event of a job change. The employment
and job mobility dynamics, combined with job-specific wages, provide additional infor-
mation for identification. For instance, conditional on the wage and hours of the current
job, if the rate of transition to part-time jobs is high, it could indicate that either individ-
uals tend to have a high preference for part-time work or the proportion of jobs with a
small part-time wage penalty is high. If the wage on the new job is high, it would sug-
gest the latter, given that the individual may accept low wages if she values part-time
work highly. In general, because unobserved heterogeneity in the model takes the form
of discrete types and wage offers are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the
panel structure of the data (containing repeated observations of a given worker and a
given worker–job match) is sufficient to identify the parameters of unobserved hetero-
geneity.23
The labor market friction parameters can be identified using information from the
observed wage distribution (Flinn and Heckman (1982)). Intuitively, if the rate of em-
ployment is low, a relatively untruncated distribution of observed wages would imply a
low job offer arrival probability, whereas a heavily truncated distribution would imply
a high taste for unemployment (i.e., high work reservation wage). The same argument
can be extended to the distribution of observed wages conditional on hours of work,
from which the job offer arrival probability is identified separately for part-time jobs
and full-time jobs. The offered wage distribution can be recovered from the truncated
distribution of observed wages due to the log-normal distributional assumption (which
satisfies the identification condition in Flinn and Heckman).
22I rank all the regional unemployment rates. The regional unemployment rate is constructed such that
it is equal to 1 if the regional unemployment rate is above the median and is equal to 0 elsewhere.
23See, for example, Chan (2013). This is in contrast with Flabbi and Moro (2012), where identification of
worker’s type and the cost of work flexibility is based on cross-sectional data on accepted wages, unem-
ployment durations, and an indicator of flexibility. In their context, the identification of worker’s type relies
on discontinuity in the accepted wage distribution.
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4.2 Estimation strategy
To ease computational burden, the fertility shock parameters βf are estimated outside
the structural model. I estimate the parameters βf (see equation (2)) by estimating a
logit regression.24 The rest of the parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood.
The unit of analysis is an employment cycle. Following the empirical job search liter-
ature, a complete employment cycle begins with an unemployment spell and ends with
another unemployment spell (if any) or a right-censored employment spell (Wolpin, Dey
and Flinn (1992, 2005)). Because job offers are i.i.d., for a given worker, each cycle is in-
dependent of each other.25 The complete likelihood function is then the product of the
likelihood of each employment cycle. Each employment spell consists of one or more
job spells, in between which the worker makes a direct job–job transition. Formally, an
employment cycle c is
c = (dT1 w˜1 H˜1    TJ w˜J H˜J) (16)
where d is the duration of the unemployment spell. Consistent with notations in the
previous section, Tj corresponds to the duration of employment with the jth employer
(job tenure) within the cycle, and w˜j and H˜j correspond to the observed wage and hour
status (h > 0) with the jth employer. Information regarding wage and hour dynamics
within a given job is ignored, so w˜j and H˜j correspond to the wage and hour observed at
the beginning of the jth job spell.26
The observed wages are measured with error. The mapping between true wage wj
and observed wage w˜j is given by
w˜j =wjevj  (17)
where vj , the measurement error, is assumed to be i.i.d. over j. Reported work hours are
measured without error, but the likelihood function of work hours is smoothed by
P(H˜j = 40)=
exp
((
aj − a∗j (ξ)
)
/c
)
1+ exp((aj − a∗j (ξ))/c)  (18)
where c is the smoothing parameter. As c goes to zero, P(H˜j = 40) goes to 1 if the match
value is above the reservation value for full-time work and to zero otherwise.27
24Recall that fertility shocks are exogenous and depend on a set of predetermined individual character-
istics. The sampling errors associated with these estimates are ignored. Therefore, the calculated standard
errors of the structural estimates may be underestimated.
25For any unemployed worker, the reservation utility for a job offer is independent from the previous
jobs she had. In this sense, entry into the unemployment state essentially restarts the job search process.
Note that all workers begin the search process from the unemployment state at T = 0.
26Hour changes are much more common between jobs than within jobs. For instance, among high-
education women, the fraction of hour changes within job spell per period is 36 percent, whereas the
fraction of hour changes between jobs is close to 20 percent (Table 2). Recent papers have emphasized
the importance of modeling within-job wage change and job mobility decisions jointly (see, e.g., Bagger,
Fontaine, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2014) and Liu (2015)). Nevertheless, among young workers, wage growth
between jobs is more important in driving overall wage growth than wage growth within jobs (Topel and
Ward (1992)).
27In estimation, c is fixed at 001.
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Measurement errors and the smoothing procedure play three roles in the estimation.
First, they capture the measurement and reporting errors in survey data. Second, they
serve to smooth over inconsistency between the model and the qualitative features of
the data. For example, under certain specifications, the model could imply that moving
from a part-time job to a full-time job after fertility shock to women is a zero probability
event. If there are such transitions observed in the data, then the model will predict zero
likelihood for these transitions at all points in the parameter space. The smoothing pro-
cedure means the probability of these events is positive in the parameter space. Third,
they serve as a smoother of the likelihood so that gradient-based numerical optimiza-
tion algorithms can be applied to maximize the objective function. For example, be-
cause of the classical measurement error assumptions, the simulated job-specific wages
have a simple mapping to the observed wages.28
Let T0 be the initial condition at the beginning of the sample. If the individual was
unemployed at the first interview, this is the number of unemployment periods prior to
the first interview date. If the individual was employed at the first interview, this refers
to the elapsed duration of the current job.29 Conditional on T0, the complete likelihood
function consists of products over workers and cycles,
L =
∏
i∈Y1
L(1)(dT1 w˜1 H˜1 w˜2 H˜2|T0)
∏
i∈Y2
L(2)(dT1 w˜1 H˜1|T0)
(19)
×
∏
i∈Y3
L(3)(dT1 w˜1 H˜1|T0)
∏
i∈Y4
L(4)(d|T0)
where i ∈ Ym denotes the set of workers who belong to the mth case of the likelihood
function. In the first case, the individual has two consecutive job spells following the
completion of an unemployment spell (if observed in the sampling period). In this case,
the likelihood contribution is defined with respect to the duration of the unemployment
spell, the duration of the first job spell, and the wages and labor supply statuses asso-
ciated with the first two jobs (fixed at their onset). In the second and third cases, the
individual has one job spell in the employment cycle, either due to transition into un-
employment at the conclusion of the first job spell (third case) or due to the fact that the
first job spell is right-censored (second case). The likelihood contribution is defined with
the unemployment duration, and the wage and labor supply of the first job. In the last
case, the observation period ends while the individual is still in an ongoing unemploy-
ment spell. Therefore, only the unemployment duration contributes to the likelihood.
The construction of the likelihood function is discussed in detail in Appendix B.30
28Measurement errors are also necessary to satisfy the support condition of the maximum likelihood
estimator.
29The SIPP contains retrospective questions on previous employment history. See Appendix A on how
these variables are constructed from the data.
30Because the SIPP is a short panel, it is quite common that the employment cycle is left-observed. For
instance, a large proportion of workers are employed continuously throughout the sampling period. To
avoid the initial condition problem, Dey and Flinn (2005) primarily utilize job spell and wage information
observed immediately after an unemployment spell (where transition to unemployment is completely ex-
ogenous in their model). Here, all individuals are used in the likelihood function, including those who are
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In each iteration in the parameter space, computation of the likelihood for a given
individual consists of nested loops. In the inner loop, the likelihood is computed con-
ditional on the expected value functions. The likelihood is computed as the weighted
average of the type-specific likelihoods, where the weights are the type probabilities.
In the outer loop, the expected value functions in the dynamic programming problem
are computed by fixed-point iteration. Reservation wages that determine the choice of
hours, employment, and job mobility are computed. The presence of worker and firm
(observed and unobserved) heterogeneity increases the state space and the value func-
tion is solved at every combination of worker and firm types. The standard errors are
computed using the Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974) (BHHH) algorithm.
5. Estimation results
Tables 3 and 4 present the simulated maximum likelihood estimates for the model. Each
column corresponds to estimates from one gender and education group. For ease of ex-
position, I distinguish three sets of parameters: (i) parameters that define the worker’s
preference for hours of work and employment, including observed and unobserved
preference heterogeneity; (ii) job search parameters, including the job offer arrival rates
and the probability of layoff; (iii) parameters that characterize the offered wage, includ-
ing heterogeneity in the wage offer and parameters that characterize the distribution of
the costs of part-time jobs and measurement errors.31
There are large differences between men and women in the impact of demograph-
ics on the preference for part-time work (αp). For both high- and low-education women,
marriage and having children raise the preference for part-time work. For instance, each
additional child increases the preference for part-time work by 215 dollars (of weekly
wages) for high-education women and 142 dollars for low-education women. The im-
pact of marriage is roughly one-half of the impact of an additional child. Marriage and
fertility have asymmetric effects on the work preferences by gender. For men, the es-
timated effects are small and mostly insignificant. There is also a high degree of het-
erogeneity in the part-time work preferences across all subsamples. The differences
between the preferences of type-2 and type-1 individuals range from 61 to 71 dollars.
Conditional on education, type-2 individuals form a larger group among women than
among men, even though men of each type place a greater value for part-time work than
women of the same type. Overall, only after accounting for the impacts of demographic
factors, women show stronger tastes for part-time work than men.32 The preference for
work (α2) is larger for high-education women than high-education men. The difference
is insignificant among low-education individuals. The estimated quadratic term of in-
come (φ0) is negative and significant, implying that the utility change from an income
change is smaller relative to the case of linear utility.
already employed at the first interview date. The initial condition problem is addressed by exploiting infor-
mation available on the first interview date (T0). See Appendix B for details.
31The parameters of fertility shocks are shown in Appendix Table A.1.
32The average baseline preferences in the population (without any demographic impacts) are quite sim-
ilar between high-education women and men (549 and 578 dollars). Among the low-educated, the average
baseline preferences are 396 dollars for women and 549 dollars for men.
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Table 3. Estimated parameters.
College High School
Female Male Female Male
Preference parameters
Type-1 intercept (αph ) 2504 4550 2420 4589
(2274) (9231) (3620) (4466)
Type 2–type 1 (μh2) 7175 7893 6152 7738
(1596) (2042) (1107) (2415)
Fraction of type-2 individuals (πh2) 065 038 041 029
(0050) (0086) (0052) (0056)
White (βh1) 1093 1823 1217 850
(2906) (6589) (2869) (8460)
Married (βh2) 1189 −160 837 −172
(2402) (1069) (2899) (5405)
Number of children (αhn) 2151 418 1423 052
(1723) (1132) (2003) (1591)
αh 22188 18023 16878 17252
(2131) (8288) (3042) (0035)
φ0 × 104 −158 −521 −184 −501
(0310) (1157) (0588) (1565)
Job search parameters
Offer arrival: unemployed (λn) 006 025 012 036
(0007) (0057) (0011) (0067)
Offer arrival: FT work (λeFT ) 020 024 019 030
(0011) (0020) (0016) (0028)
Offer arrival: PT work (λePT ) 026 064 037 078
(0015) (0054) (0031) (0095)
Layoff: FT work (δFT ) 001 000 002 000
(0001) (0000) (0002) (0001)
Layoff: PT work (δPT ) 004 003 006 008
(0005) (0010) (0007) (0013)
lnL −332248 −210769 −209672 −151490
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Turning to the estimated job search parameters, there are sizable differences be-
tween genders in the offer arrival rate and the probability of layoff. For high-education
women, the probability of receiving a job offer in each period is 006 if they are unem-
ployed, 020 if they are employed on a full-time job, and 026 if they work part time. In
comparison, for high-educated men, the offer arrival probability is higher in each state
of labor supply. The estimated layoff probability is also higher for women than for men.
The difference is especially pronounced conditional on full-time work. For instance,
the probability of full-time job destruction per period is 12 percent for high-education
women and only 01 percent for high-education men. Another important finding is that
the probabilities of job offer arrival and layoff vary greatly by current hours of work
across all subsamples. Offer arrival probability is higher when the individual is working
part time than full time, partly due to the high rate of turnover of part-time jobs. It may
also indicate that part-time workers search harder for better job opportunities, perhaps
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Table 4. Estimated offered wage parameters.
College High School
Female Male Female Male
Offered wage parameters
Intercept 208 205 177 192
(0010) (0024) (0000) (0000)
High unemployment rate −001 −001 −001 −001
(0003) (0018) (0016) (0005)
White 005 017 008 013
(0009) (0022) (0012) (0020)
Metro area residence 007 012 011 010
(0006) (0022) (0010) (0020)
Match heterogeneity (σ2a0 ) 004 004 003 003
(0003) (0006) (0003) (0005)
Low-cost firm (ξ1) 006 021 000 018
(0013) (0041) (0002) (0018)
High-cost firm (ξ2) 030 086 036 059
(0010) (0236) (0021) (0306)
Fraction of high-cost firm (πξ2) 070 095 068 088
(0035) (0014) (0040) (0026)
Measurement errors
σ2v 014 013 008 010
(0006) (0006) (0005) (0005)
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.
due to the lower opportunity costs of conducting on-the-job search. The probability of
job destruction is much higher among part-time workers than full-time workers, which
broadly conforms to descriptive evidence from the data that part-time job spells are
shorter than full-time job spells. As evidenced in the counterfactual analysis below, the
differences in job search parameters between full-time and part-time work is another
important margin affecting labor supply decisions.
Table 4 shows the estimated offered wage parameters. For each education–gender
group, the coefficient on local unemployment rate is negative. Holding all else equal,
for workers living in states with high unemployment rate, the offered hourly wages are
about 1 percent less than workers living in areas of low unemployment rate. Workers
who are white and/or residing in metropolitan areas receive higher wage offers on av-
erage. Compared with men of the same characteristics, white women have a smaller
offered wage premium than white men. Firms are heterogeneous in the cost of accom-
modating part-time work (expressed as a wage penalty for part-time work). Among high-
educated women, about 30 percent of jobs are offered by low-cost firms, whose offered
part-time wage is reduced by 6 percent. The remaining majority of jobs are provided
by high-cost firms, where the offered part-time wage is about 70 percent lower than
full-time wage (holding everything else constant). Interestingly, relative to women, men
tend to face an even greater wage cost for working part-time. For both high- and low-
educated men, close to 90 percent of jobs belong to the high-cost group. These high-cost
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Figure 2. Actual and predicted wage distributions for workers.
firms pay the same man 59 percent (low-education) and 86 percent (high-education)
less if he chooses to work part time over full time.33
Figure 2 plots the actual and predicted wage distributions of workers. Actual wages
are based on the observed wage in the first job spell (w˜1 in the likelihood function). Pre-
dicted wages are calculated by simulating 20 paths into steady state for each individual.
Each simulated wage in steady state is drawn conditional on the individual’s observed
characteristics and initial condition when w˜1 is observed.34 The model is able to predict
the essential features of the wage distribution (such as the wage where density peaks) for
each subsample. However, the model tends to underpredict the fraction of workers with
low wages. Table 5 reports the predicted and actual fraction of full-time work among
Table 5. Predicted and actual full-time choices.
FT Data (%) FT Predicted (%)
High-education women 833 850
Low-education women 790 750
High-education men 972 967
Low-education men 963 947
33I have tried to increase the number of firm types to three. For the samples of men, the additional type
is not precisely estimated.
34For workers, it contains the elapsed duration of the current job (if the current spell is left-censored)
or the preceding duration of unemployment spell in the same employment cycle (if the current job spell is
not left-censored). Both durations are identified using the retrospective questions on employment histories
(see Appendix A for details). Conditioning on these duration spells is necessary given that the distribution
of these durations may differ between the steady state and the data due to many young workers in the data.
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Table 6. Wage elasticities of labor supply.
Wage Incr. Wage Incr.
Baseline By 10% Elasticity Baseline By 10% Elasticity
High-education women High-education men
Work 070 077 093 098 099 006
PT 008 006 −191 003 002 −074
FT 063 071 129 096 096 009
Low-education women Low-education men
Work 075 080 070 095 098 026
PT 014 012 −159 003 001 −530
FT 061 068 122 093 096 042
workers when w˜1 is observed. Overall, the model predicts the fraction of full-time work-
ers fairly accurately.
Based on the estimated parameters, I compute the uncompensated labor supply
elasticity. I consider a 10 percent increase in the mean offered wage rate at the base-
line. The elasticities measure the average percentage change in the fraction of part-time,
full-time, and total employment in steady state. Table 6 shows that the wage elastic-
ity of employment is small and close to zero for men (006 among high-educated and
026 among low-educated). Women have a higher wage elasticity of employment (093
among high-educated and 070 among low-educated). The same pattern of gender dif-
ference is also seen at the margin of part-time and full-time work. For instance, the wage
elasticity of full-time work for high-education women is 129, whereas it is only 009 for
high-education men. Note that the discrete set of hours of work means that the value
of the elasticity depends on the distribution of heterogeneity around the cutoff points
(reservation wages). It is also determined by the shape of the budget constraint (espe-
cially the kink generated by the wage cost of part-time work). These estimates will be
different if the baseline budget constraint is different.
6. Counterfactual analysis
6.1 Evaluating sources of the gender gap
Using the estimates from the model, I conduct counterfactual analysis to assess the ef-
fect of various factors on gender gaps. The counterfactual analysis is carried out by sim-
ulating 20 paths in steady state for every individual in the sample.35
The top panel of Table 7 reports contributions of various factors in explaining the
gender gap in wage and employment among high-education individuals. I report pre-
35Individual covariates are fixed at the first interview date. The unobserved type of each individual is
drawn from the type probability distribution at the beginning of each path. All individuals are unemployed
at the beginning of each simulation path and steady state outcomes are evaluated after simulating the
model for 80 periods.
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Table 7. Sources of gender gap in wage and unemployment.
% of Gender Gap
No Work PT FT Wage PT Wage FT Wage Wage No Work
High-education women
Baseline 030 008 063 1114 943 1136
High-education men 002 003 096 1296 995 1304 1000% 1000%
Pref. for work 022 009 069 1107 885 1136 −42% 288%
Pref. for PT work, demographics 023 003 074 1124 850 1134 55% 230%
Pref. for PT work, types 031 009 060 1110 943 1136 −22% −56%
Offer arrival probability 009 014 078 1143 977 1172 156% 756%
Layoff probability 013 008 079 1148 969 1165 183% 581%
PT wage penalty 029 000 071 1132 780 1133 98% 12%
Mean offered FT wage 023 006 071 1234 971 1256 658% 226%
Match heterogeneity 029 007 063 1120 947 1140 30% 09%
Low-education women
Baseline 025 014 061 819 749 835
Low-education men 005 003 093 1060 795 1068 1000% 1000%
Pref. for work 027 014 059 820 749 837 07% −92%
Pref. for PT work, demographics 019 007 074 823 741 830 17% 311%
Pref. for PT work, types 029 019 052 817 739 845 −09% −193%
Offer arrival probability 012 023 065 836 770 858 69% 640%
Layoff probability 016 009 076 850 748 862 131% 470%
PT wage penalty 025 002 073 827 636 831 33% −03%
Mean offered FT wage 017 010 073 978 863 994 660% 423%
Match heterogeneity 025 013 062 836 758 853 71% 16%
Note: The predictions from the model are without any measurement error assumption. High-education workers refer to
those with at least some college education. Low-education workers refer to those with only a high school education. The final
two columns show the percentage of the baseline gender gap explained by each factor.
dicted outcomes under different counterfactual scenarios. The gender gap is defined as
the difference between the baseline scenario and the “high-education men” scenario
(second row) where the predicted outcomes are based on the estimated parameters of
high-education men. The contribution of a factor, expressed as a fraction of the gender
gap, is defined as the difference in the predicted outcome between the baseline scenario
and the counterfactual scenario where the factor is kept fixed at men’s value. I consider
the following factors: work preferences, including the preference for not working and
the preference for part-time work; job search parameters, including the job offer ar-
rival probabilities and layoff probabilities; the offered wage consisting of the wage cost
of part-time provision, mean offered wage (conditional on individuals’ characteristics),
and match heterogeneity. In order of importance, the key factors explaining the gender
wage gap are mean offered wage, job search parameters, wage cost of part-time work
provision, and demographics in the part-time work preferences; they explain 658, 339,
98, and 55 percent of the gender wage gap, respectively. The key factors explaining the
gender employment gap are job search parameters, preference for work, demographics
in the part-time work preferences, and mean offered wage; they explain 133, 288, 23,
and 226 percent of the gender gap in employment, respectively.
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Although work preferences can explain a large part of the gender gap in employ-
ment, they explain only a small fraction of the gender gap in hourly wages. For instance,
if the preference for not working among high-education women is reduced to the value
of high-education men, employment would increase by 8 percent as more individuals
are attracted into employment. At the same time, the reservation wage for employment
is lower, which, in this case, reduces the average wage of part-time work from over 943
to 885 dollars. As a result, the overall wage (unconditional on hours of work) decreases
slightly relative to the baseline, even as the share of full-time work increases relative to
part-time work. Similar arguments apply to changes in part-time work preference. For
instance, when the impacts of demographics on part-time work preference are reduced
to the value of high-education men, average wage among women only shows a small
increase from 1114 to 1124 dollars. As part-time work preference is reduced, full-time
work is more attractive than part-time work and unemployment, resulting in a rise in
full-time work among women (from 063 to 074) and a drop in the percentage of unem-
ployment and part-time work. Smaller preferences for part-time work reduce the reser-
vation wage for full-time employment, which leads to a small reduction in the average
full-time wage. Part-time wage in steady state also decreases from 943 to 85 dollars, as
part-time workers of high match-specific wage now switched to full-time work. Over-
all, the rise in the average wage from a reduction in the part-time work preference (due
to asymmetric demographic effects) is completely driven by an increase in the share of
full-time work.36
The fact that the offered wage explains the largest fraction of the gender wage gap in-
dicates the importance of labor market constraints in generating the gender wage gap.
Among high-education individuals, the mean offered wage is the main channel driving
the positive gender wage gap. This is the wage component that is not match-specific
and may be interpreted as differences in return to general human capital. In fact, the es-
timated match heterogeneity is quite similar between genders and hence has negligible
impact on the gender wage gap. When high-education women face the part-time wage
penalty of high-education men (which is much larger), they choose more full-time work
as expected, which reduces the overall gender wage gap. Average wages conditional on
hours of work are lower, however. Because the reservation wage for full-time work also
decreases, the full-time wage is reduced from 1136 to 1133 dollars. Job search behaviors
characterized by job offer probabilities and layoff probabilities can also explain a sizable
share of the gender wage gap. These parameters govern the speed of wage progression
in this type of model. Higher job offer probabilities and lower layoff probabilities (rela-
tive to the current values of women) help women climb up the job ladder by sampling
high wage offers faster and reducing the risk of going down the ladder, which “resets”
the wage progression process. The total contribution of job search behavior in explain-
ing the gender wage gap (around 30 percent) is quite similar to the evidence presented
36In a general equilibrium model (e.g., Mortensen (1990), Bowlus (1997)), firms also have incentives to
lower the average offered full-time wage in response to the reduction in the preference (because more work-
ers now want to work full time, firms can lower wages and still attract workers). The reduction in the offered
wage will increase the gender wage gap further, meaning that the contribution from part-time work prefer-
ence in this paper is likely to be an upper bound.
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in Bowlus (1997), despite the differences in model specifications, estimation, and data.
Although the contribution of offered wage exceeds that of job search behavior in ex-
plaining the gender wage gap, their relative importance is reversed when it comes to
the gender gap in employment. This is mainly due to the small wage elasticity of labor
supply implied by the model, relative to the job offer probability elasticity.37
The bottom panel of Table 7 reports the contributions of various factors in explaining
the gender gap in wage and employment among low-education individuals. In general,
the order of importance of various factors in explaining the gender gaps is comparable to
the high-education women. Mean offered wage accounts for the majority of the gender
wage gap and job search behavior is the most significant contribution to the gender
gap in employment. There are some notable differences. For instance, demographics in
part-time work preferences explain only a small fraction of the predicted wage gap. They
still can reduce the gender gap in employment by 31 percent. In the meantime, they also
reduce both part-time wage and full-time wage due to changes in the reservation wage.
The average wage, after taking into account compositional changes in labor supply, is
only slightly higher than the baseline wage (from 819 to 823 dollars). Interestingly, the
quantitative role of job offer and destruction probabilities is smaller for the gender wage
gap among low-education individuals. Together they explain 20 percent of the gender
wage gap. Match heterogeneity plays a slightly more important role for the low educated
than for the high educated.
Table 8 presents the predicted job and unemployment spells in steady state under
the baseline and each counterfactual scenario.38 Among both high- and low-education
individuals, women on average have shorter full-time job spells and longer unemploy-
ment spells relative to men. Naturally, much of the gender gap in job and unemploy-
ment durations is driven by different job offer arrival and destruction probabilities be-
tween genders.39 The counterfactual simulations suggest that changes in reservation
wage also play an important role. For instance, when high-education women are able
to receive job offers at the same frequency as high-education men (higher arrival prob-
ability per period), the full-time job duration increases from 237 to 254 periods. This
is due to an increase in the average match quality in steady state (evidenced also in
the predicted wages in Table 7), which increases the reservation wage for job mobil-
ity. Reducing women’s work preferences shortens unemployment spells. Reducing the
women’s preference for part-time work (for example, through a reduction in the de-
mographic impacts) shortens both part-time and full-time job spells. As full-time jobs
become more valuable relative to part-time work and unemployment, the effect on
the latter is mainly driven by a lower predicted average match quality among full-time
jobs.
The evidence from Tables 7 and 8 combined indicates that the gender gap is even
more pronounced due to men having longer full-time job spells in addition to higher
37See Chan (2013) for similar evidence.
38Note that individuals in the data are observed for a maximum of 4 years during ages 23–35. Therefore,
the simulated spells in steady state are not directly comparable to the spells observed in the data.
39Recall from Table 3 that men tend to have a higher rate of job arrival and a lower rate of job destruction
than women.
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Table 8. Sources of gender differences in job turnover.
Job Duration FT Job Spell
PT FT No Work PV % Gender Gap
High-education women
Baseline 132 238 281 2702
High-education men 213 306 93 3983 1000%
Pref. for work 118 238 178 2709 06%
Pref. for PT work, demographics 88 229 244 2591 −86%
Pref. for PT work, types 136 229 286 2605 −75%
Offer arrival probability 113 262 53 3069 286%
Layoff probability 160 306 379 3566 675%
PT wage penalty 126 228 386 2586 −91%
Mean offered FT wage 137 237 232 2974 213%
Match heterogeneity 132 239 285 2726 19%
Low-education women
Baseline 99 204 137 1704
Low-education men 99 273 120 2913 1000%
Pref. for work 110 204 150 1707 02%
Pref. for PT work, demographics 93 203 100 1683 −17%
Pref. for PT work, types 104 224 158 1896 159%
Offer arrival probability 90 183 46 1570 −111%
Layoff probability 91 297 166 2563 711%
PT wage penalty 106 211 236 1755 43%
Mean offered FT wage 97 210 75 2091 320%
Match heterogeneity 103 207 137 1765 50%
Note: The predictions from the model are without any measurement error assumption. High-education workers refer to
those with at least some college education. Low-education workers refer to those with only a high school education. The final
column shows the percentage of the baseline gender gap explained by each factor.
wages than women. The final two columns in Table 8 calculate the present value of an
average full-time job by multiplying the predicted full-time wage with predicted full-
time job duration. Among high-education individuals, the present value of an average
full-time job for men is 3983 dollars, which is 47 percent higher than that for women.
Job search parameters become the most important in explaining this definition of gen-
der gap than the mean offered baseline wage. This is because increasing women’s offer
arrival probabilities and lowering layoff probabilities reinforces two factors: it increases
both the hourly wage and the job durations for full-time work.
6.2 Evaluating counterfactual policies
Table 9 and 10 present the effects of counterfactual policies on hours of work and wages
in steady state for low- and high-education individuals, respectively. Two counterfactual
policies are considered: equal pay, where the wage cost of part-time work provision is
reduced to zero, and equal protection, where the job destruction probabilities between
full-time and part-time work are equalized (at the lower layoff rate from full-time work).
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Table 9. Effects of counterfactual policies: high-education individuals.
Baseline Equal Pay Equal Protection
High-education women
No work 030 030 023
PT 008 028 018
FT 063 042 058
Wage 1114 1110 1109
PT wage 943 1039 1000
FT wage 1136 1158 1143
Utility 39823 40388 40397
High-education men
No work 002 005 001
PT 003 034 008
FT 096 061 091
Wage 1296 1289 1279
PT wage 995 1246 1010
FT wage 1304 1312 1304
Utility 37630 39606 37862
% change in gender gap
Wage −13% −61%
No work −113% −194%
Note: The predictions from the model are without any measurement error assumption. High-education workers refer to
those with at least some college education. Low-education workers refer to those with only a high school education.
Table 10. Effects of counterfactual policies: low-education individuals.
Baseline Equal Pay Equal Protection
Low-education women
No work 025 021 017
PT 014 031 028
FT 061 048 055
Wage 819 815 820
PT wage 749 775 788
FT wage 835 841 836
Utility 30442 30968 31127
Low-education men
No work 005 006 002
PT 003 024 013
FT 093 070 084
Wage 1060 1045 1037
PT wage 795 984 854
FT wage 1068 1067 1066
Utility 33245 34166 33499
% change in gender gap
Wage −48% −100%
No work −236% −259%
Note: The predictions from the model are without any measurement error assumption. High-education workers refer to
those with at least some college education. Low-education workers refer to those with only a high school education.
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These policies aim to promote equality between part-time and full-time workers, which
have been in place in many countries in Europe.40
For both men and women, equal pay reduces the gender gap in employment by
113 percent among the high-educated and 236 percent among the low-educated (sec-
ond columns). It also reduces the overall gender wage gap by 13 percent among high-
education individuals and 48 percent among low-education individuals. Interestingly,
this reduction in the overall gender wage gap is not driven by the level of part-time
wages, where the elimination of the wage penalty should have large positive effects. Al-
though the part-time wage does increase among women, it increases even more among
men. Full-time wage also increases, because the equalization of offered part-time and
full-time wage means that individuals must require a higher wage so as to work full time.
Equal pay leads to a large increase in the fraction of part-time work and a large decrease
in the fraction of full-time work. The absolute increase in part-time work is more pro-
nounced among men than women. As a result, overall wage decreases due to the compo-
sitional changes in part-time/full-time work and the drop is more pronounced among
men. The policy increases welfare among both men and women, expressed in terms
of average period utility in the steady state (including the utility flows from unemploy-
ment). In terms of relative welfare gains (as a fraction of baseline utility), men benefit
more from the policy than women do.41
Similar to equal pay, equal protection also reduces the gender gap in unemployment,
especially among low-education women. For instance, among low-education individu-
als, the fraction of women not working drops from 025 to 017, whereas the fraction of
unemployed men decreases from 005 to 002 (third columns). Given that the policy re-
duces the destruction rate of part-time jobs, part-time wage tends to increase relative
to the baseline (because the average match quality of part-time jobs improves in steady
state). The impact on full-time wage is more complex. On the one hand, equal protection
reduces unemployment and the reservation wage to work, which should have a negative
impact on the average match quality. On the other hand, conditional on work prefer-
ences, it increases the reservation wage for full-time work due to the rise in the value
of part-time work. The positive effect appears to be dominating among high-education
women (whose full-time wage increases from 1136 to 1143 dollars), whereas the nega-
tive effect dominates among low-education men (whose full-time wage decreases from
1068 to 1066 dollars). Among low-education individuals, the overall gender wage gap is
reduced by 10 percent. Among high-education individuals, equal protection has smaller
effects on the gender gap in both wage and unemployment. The gender gaps in wage
and unemployment are reduced by 61 and 194 percent, respectively. The relative wel-
fare gains from the equal protection are larger among women than among men. For
40In 1997, the European Union (EU) introduced a directive that provides protection to part-time workers
in terms of both pay and benefits. Following the EU directive, in 2000, the United Kingdom adopted the
Part-Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favorable Treatment) Regulations. This legislation mandated the
same hourly rates of pay and benefits for part-time and full-time workers. It also specifies that any dismissal
due to the nature of working hours shall be regarded as unfairly dismissed.
41Interestingly, among high-education individuals, the average period utility is larger among women rel-
ative to men. This is largely driven by the large estimated value of nonmarket work for high-education
women relative to high-education men (see Table 3).
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instance, among low-education individuals, women’s welfare increases by about 2 per-
cent (from 30442 to 31127), whereas men’s welfare only increases by less than 1 percent
(from 33245 to 33499).42
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I used a dynamic structural model to analyze sources of the gender wage
gap. In the model, individuals make discrete choices of hours of work and job mobil-
ity, where each job is characterized by the match quality and the wage cost of part-time
work. Labor supply decisions at the intensive margin directly affect the utilities, the of-
fered hourly wages, and the stability of a worker–firm match (through affecting the job
arrival and destruction rates). The structural model was estimated using the 1996 panel
of the SIPP.
I used the estimated model to quantify the relative importance of the preferences for
part-time work and various sources of labor market constraints in explaining the gender
gap in wages, including job arrival rates, job destruction rates, the mean and variance
of the wage offer distribution, and the wage cost of part-time work. Among both high-
and low-education individuals, about 65 percent of the observed gender difference in
hourly wages is due to differences in the mean offered wages. In order of importance,
the remaining key factors explaining the gender wage gap are the job search parame-
ters, the wage cost of part-time work, and demographic factors affecting the part-time
work preferences. Differences in the job search parameters account for 30 percent of the
gender wage gap among high-education individuals. They play a more prominent role
when it comes to explaining the gender gap in the present value of full-time jobs, which
is amplified by the gender differences in job duration. Although marriage and children
can explain a sizable fraction of the gender gap in employment, they explain no more
than 6 percent of the gender wage gap. The findings suggest that most of the observed
gender wage gap of employed men and women attributes to labor market constraints.
The findings have important policy implications. In recent years, many countries
have promoted equal opportunities between working part-time and working full-time.
Two main pillars of the reform are equal pay and equal protection. The former corre-
sponds to the case in the model where the wage cost of part-time work provision is re-
duced to zero. The latter can be modeled as that the job destruction probability is equal-
ized between full-time and part-time work. The estimated model allows us to broadly
investigate the implications of these policies by conducting counterfactual policy evalu-
ations. For instance, relative to equal pay, equal protection is more effective in reducing
the gender wage gap (especially among low-educated individuals).
Appendix A: Construction of the samples
I focus on the primary job, which is defined as the job generating the most earnings in
a wave. Although SIPP has monthly information on job change and earnings, the time
42Throughout this paper, the unit of a decision maker is an individual. Policy changes may affect the
allocation of market and home production within a household, which are not captured by the model. This
important extension is left for future research.
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unit in the analysis of this paper is 4 months (a wave). This avoids the seam bias if we
were using monthly variables. Real monthly earnings and wages are derived by deflating
the reported monthly earnings and wages by monthly U.S. urban CPI. Reported hourly
wage rates are used whenever the worker is paid by the hour. For these workers, their
real wages per wave are the mean of monthly real wages over 4 months. For workers who
are not paid hourly, their real wages are obtained by dividing real earnings per wave by
reported hours of labor supply per wave.43 Job change is identified from a change in job
ID between waves. No job ID would be assigned to individuals who were unemployed
through the wave.
From the original SIPP 1996 panel, I keep individuals aged between 23 and 35.44
I drop full-time students, the self-employed, the disabled, those who appeared less than
3 years (out of 4 years) of the interviews, and those who were recalled by their previous
employer after a separation. I select individuals who have at least high school educa-
tion. I trim the population of those whose real wage is in the top or bottom 1 percent of
the real wage distribution, by wave. In the first wave of SIPP, respondents are asked the
starting date of the present job. I use this information to construct the correct job tenure
for workers with elapsed job duration when they are first interviewed. Subsequently, the
tenure of the present job in the next wave is just the recoded job tenure plus 1 unless a
job change is observed in the sample. For individuals who were unemployed at the first
survey, year and month when the individual last worked are recorded in the SIPP Top-
ical Module (surveyed in the first wave). I use this information to compute unemploy-
ment durations that were left-censored for these individuals. After these corrections, job
tenure and unemployment spells are non-left-censored through the sample period.
The unit of analysis is an employment cycle. A complete employment cycle be-
gins with an unemployment spell and ends with workers quitting from employment to
nonemployment. To create a sample used for estimation, I keep observations from the
beginning of the sample period (including both employed and unemployed individuals
at that time) up to the end of the first employment cycle (if observed in the sample) or
to the end of the sample period, whenever the cycle is right-censored. When there are
more than two job spells observed in the same employment cycle within the sample,
only the first two jobs are kept (see Section 4.2 for details).
Appendix B: The likelihood function
Unemployment spell only. An unemployed worker, with probability λn, receives i.i.d.
draws of a and ξ from F(ξ) and G(a), respectively. Conditional on the worker’s unob-
served type μhk, the probability of becoming employed in every period is given by45
p(D= 1|μhk)=
∑
j
πξjp
(
D= 1|ξ = ξjμhk
)=∑
j
λnπξjG˜
(
a¯
(
ξj
))
 (B.1)
43For each month, respondents report their hours of work per week and how many weeks worked.
Monthly labor supply is calculated as hours per week × (weeks worked/weeks in month)× 433.
44Because the SIPP is a short panel and the expected college completion age is 23, this selection criterion
ensures that the highest completed education level is obtained for each individual.
45Note that the likelihood function is defined on each individual, which is always conditional on her
observed characteristics α− ≡ {nxhxw}.
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where G˜(a¯(ξj)) = 1 − G(a¯(ξj)) and ξj is the potential type of the new job.46 If there is
only one unemployment spell in the sample, then the conditional likelihood function is
simply given by
L(4)(d|T0μhk)=
d∏
t=1
(
1−p(D= 1|μhk)
)
 (B.2)
where μh is the unobserved type of the individual, which needs to be integrated out. The
unconditional likelihood function is then
L(4)(d|T0)=
∑
k
L(4)(d|T0μh = μhk)× P(μhk|T0) (B.3)
Note that P(μhk|T0) = πhk because of possible selection into unemployment after pref-
erence shocks. Using Bayes’ rule, I evaluate the conditional probability that the individ-
ual is of type k as
P(μhk|T0)= P(T0|μhk)πhk∑
i
P(T0|μhi)πhi
 (B.4)
where πhk is the fraction of type-k worker in the population and the conditional prob-
ability P(T0|μhk) can be estimated directly from the structural model. This yields the
“best” summary of the individual’s unobserved type given the data available.
One or two job spells. For a given worker, entry into unemployment essentially resets
the search process, meaning that previous employment cycles are independent from
the job offers once one becomes unemployed. Due to the i.i.d. assumption on the offer
draws, the duration of unemployment spell within a cycle is independent from job spells
in the cycle, leading to
P(c)= P(d)P(T1 w˜1 H˜1    TJ w˜J H˜J) (B.5)
The term P(c) forms the basis of the likelihood function. Because the wage one is will-
ing to accept depends on the wage and the type of firm of the previous job, job spells
within cycles are not independent. Below I use simulation methods to construct likeli-
hood contributions involving completed or censored job spells.
For all likelihood contributions involving job spells, I only use information of up to
the first two job spells in every employment cycle in the likelihood function so as to
minimize computational burden. This includes {dT1 w˜1 H˜1 w˜2 H˜2 }.47
There are three ways to exit the first job spell. First, she may quit to unemployment
involuntarily, which happens with a constant probability δ. Second, she may move to
another employer, either to work full time or to work part time. Third, she may quit to
46Note that when the probability of exiting unemployment is constant given the individual’s type, it is
irrelevant whether the beginning of the unemployment spell is observed (see also Dey and Flinn (2005)).
47Given that SIPP is a short panel, the information loss is little because few workers in the data change
jobs more than twice in a single employment cycle.
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unemployment voluntarily due to a fertility shock. Let P denote the likelihood of quit-
ting from a full-time job. Then the probability that she exits the current job {ξ1 a1} is
m(a1 ξ1μhk)= p(D= 0|a1 ξ1μhk)+p(M = 1|a1 ξ1μhk)+ δ (B.6)
where p(D = 0|a1 ξ1μhk) is the likelihood of voluntary quit to unemployment.48 The
probability that a job–job transition takes place can be written as
p(M = 1|a1 ξ1μhk)= λe(1− δ)
∑
j
πξjG˜
(
ar
(
ξ
j
2 a1 ξ1
))
 (B.7)
where it is summed over the potential types of new jobs (ξj2 denotes the new job of type
j and πξj is the fraction of type-j firms in the population).
Conditional on the first job of type ξ1 and match value a1 and the unobserved type
of the individual, the likelihood of one employment cycle is given by
L(1)(dT1 w˜1 H˜1 w˜2 H˜2|μhkξ1 a1T0)
= λnG˜
(
a¯(ξ1)
) d∏
t=1
(
1−p(D= 1|μhk)
)× h(w˜1|w1)×p(H˜1|H1)
(B.8)
×
T1∏
τ=T0+1
(
1−m(a1 ξ1μhk)
)
×
{
λe(1− δ)
∑
j
πξjG˜
(
ar
(
ξ
j
2 a1 ξ1
))
h
(
w˜2|w2
(
ξj
))
p(H˜2|H2)
}

where density functions h and p are generated from the measurement error assump-
tion. Note that to evaluate h(w˜2|w2(ξj)) and p(H˜2|H2), I rely on a simulation method
to draw f (a2|ξ2 ξ1 a1μhk). First, ζ2 is drawn from a uniform distribution defined on
the interval [01]. Then a2 is a random draw from a truncated normal distribution with
the lower truncation point given by the reservation wage for switching to the second
job, ar(ξ2 a1 ξ1). Given a2 and ξ2, wage and hour status on the second job can be pre-
dicted.
To form the likelihood contribution for the individual, we need to average over un-
observed individual heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, and match heterogeneity of the
first job (a1). Because a1 is the match value of an accepted offer, it no longer follows the
exogenous population distribution of matches G(a). I use a simulation method to draw
a1 from G(a1|ξ1μhk), which follows a truncated normal distribution with a lower trun-
48The probability of voluntary quit is given by (1 − p(M = 1|a1 ξ1μhk) − δ) × exp((a¯(ξ1)−a1)/c)1+exp((a¯(ξ1)−a1)/c) . Note
that, given the setup of the model, quit to unemployment is conditional on not being displaced from the
current job and not receiving a superior offer from a different employer. The logistic function is used to
smooth over inconsistency between the model and the data, where, as previously, c is a smoothing param-
eter fixed at 001.
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Table A.1. Fertility shock parameters.
College High School
Female Male Female Male
Married 0964∗∗∗ 2012∗∗∗ 0156 1148∗∗∗
(0215) (0314) (0290) (0318)
Regional unemployment 0092 −0144 0203 −0207
(0157) (0172) (0275) (0246)
White −0045 0088 −0032 0282
(0189) (0230) (0303) (0306)
Metro residence 0117 −0053 0258 0247
(0219) (0225) (0340) (0286)
Constant −4984∗∗∗ −5643∗∗∗ −5081∗∗∗ −5598∗∗∗
(0323) (0413) (0455) (0462)
cation point given by the reservation value for employment (at a¯(ξ1)).49 Given that the
reservation match value depends on the type of the job and the type of the worker, each
simulated draw of a1 (denoted as as1) is conditional on the type of the job and the type of
the worker. The unconditional likelihood function becomes
L(1)(dT1 w˜1 H˜1 w˜2 H˜2|T0)
= 1
S
∑
k
∑
p
∑
s
L(1)
(
dT1 w˜1 H˜1 w˜2 H˜2|μhkξp1  as1T0
)
(B.9)
× P(μhkξp1  as1|T0)
I use Bayes’ rule to evaluate the posterior distribution of the firm and individual’s unob-
served types and the (simulated) match draws, conditional on the information observed
at the first interview T0:
P
(
μhkξ
p
1  a
s
1|T0
)= P
(
T0|μhkξp1  as1
)
πhkπξp
1
S
∑
k
∑
p
∑
s
P
(
T0|μhkξp1  as1
)
πhkπξp
 (B.10)
Interview T0 is the elapsed duration of the current job at the first interview date (if the
individual was employed then) or periods of unemployment that are left-censored (if
the individual was unemployed then).50 The T0 reveals additional information that can
be used to identify the initial joint distribution of match quality, unobserved types of the
firm and the worker. The conditional probability, P(T0|μhkξp1  as1), is the likelihood of
49I draw ζ1 from a uniform distribution defined on the interval [01]. Then the inverse of the cumulative
distribution function G at ζ˜1 (where ζ˜1 =G(a¯(ξ1))+ (1−G(a¯(ξ1))× ζ1)) produces the simulated (a1). For
each combination of the individual and firm types, I simulate 10 draws.
50When T0 is the elapsed unemployment durations, P(μhkξ
p
1  a
s
1|T0)= P(μhk|T0)×P(ξp1  as1|μhk). Then
P(μhk|T0) can be evaluated using equation (B.4).
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observing T0 at the first interview. The unconditional likelihood function can be written
as
L(1)(dT1 w˜1 H˜1 w˜2 H˜2|T0)
= 1
S
∑
k
∑
p
∑
s
L(1)
(
dT1 w˜1 H˜1 w˜2 H˜2|μhkξp1  as1T0
)
(B.11)
×πhkπξpω
(
μhkξ
p
1  a
s
1
)

where ω(μhkξ
p
1  a
s
1) ≡
P(T0|μhkξp1 as1)
1
S
∑
k
∑
p
∑
s P(T0|μhkξp1 as1)πhkπξp
. For each tuple {μhkξp1  as1}, the
likelihood contribution is multiplied by a weight that is proportional to the likelihood of
observing initial condition T0.
If there is only one job spell in the employment cycle, then the likelihood contribu-
tion is simpler. Supposing the first job spell is right-censored, the conditional likelihood
function is
L(2)(dT1 w˜1 H˜1|μhkξ1 a1T0)
= p(D= 1|ξ1μhk)
d∏
t=1
(
1−p(D= 1|μhk)
)× h(w˜1|w1)×p(H˜1|H1) (B.12)
×
T1∏
τ=T0+1
(
1−m(a1 ξ1μhk)
)

and if the first job spell ends with an unemployment spell, we have
L(3)(dT1 w˜1 H˜1|μhkξ1 a1T0)
= p(D= 1|ξ1μhk)
d∏
t=1
(
1−p(D= 1|μhk)
)× h(w˜1|w1)×p(H˜1|H1) (B.13)
× (δ+p(D= 0|a1 ξ1μhk))× T1∏
τ=T0+1
(
1−m(a1 ξ1μhk)
)

In either case, the unconditional likelihood contribution is obtained by averaging over a
large number of simulation paths and over all possible individual types:
L(m)(dT1 w˜1 H˜1|T0)
= 1
S
∑
k
∑
p
∑
s
L(m)
(
dT1 w˜1 H˜1|μhkξp1  as1T0
)
×πhkπξpω
(
μhkξ
p
1  a
s
1
)
 m= {23}
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